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COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION, a
Utah Corporation
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 940483-CA
v.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A.
Defendant and Appellant,

Priority No. 15

RENAISSANCE EXCHANGE, INC. and
DON NEWSOM,
Third-Party Defendants.
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Defendant and appellant First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A. ("First Security") respectfully submits this reply brief in
response to the arguments stated in the brief submitted by
plaintiff and appellee America First Credit Union (the "Credit
Union").
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-106:
"Account" means any right to payment for
goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which is not evidenced by an
instrument or chattel paper, whether or
not it has been earned by performance.
"General intangibles" means any personal
property (including things in action)
other than goods, accounts, chattel
paper, documents, instruments, and
money. All rights to payment earned or
unearned under a charter or other
contract involving the use or hire of a
vessel and all rights incident to the
charter or contract are accounts.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-203(1):
(1) Subject to the provisions of
Section 70A-4-208 on the security
interest of a collecting bank, Section
70A-8-321 on security interests in
securities, and Section 70A-9-113 on a
security interest arising under the
chapter on sales, a security interest is
not enforceable against the debtor or
third parties with respect to the
collateral and does not attach unless:
(a) the collateral is in the
possession of the secured party
pursuant to agreement, or the
debtor has signed a security
agreement which contains a
description of the collateral and
in addition, when the security
interest covers crops growing when
the security interest covers crops
growing or to be grown or timber to
be cut, a description of the land
concerned;
(b)

value has been given; and

(c) the debtor has rights in
the collateral.

-1-

III. Utah Code Ann, § 70A-9-318(3):
(3) The account debtor is
authorized to pay the assignor until the
account debtor receives notification
that the amount due or to become due has
been assigned and that payment is to be
made to the assignee. A notification
which does not reasonably identify the
rights assigned is ineffective. If
requested by the account debtor, the
assignee must seasonably furnish
reasonable proof that the assignment has
been made and unless he does so the
account debtor may pay the assignor.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND FULL OPINION
As is made clear in First Security's briefs, several
courts have ruled on the principal issue presented to this court
for decision.

Although Utah law is consistent with the position

taken by these other courts, it is not clear and explicit.

For

planning purposes in the area of secured transactions, it would
be helpful to have a clear holding on the issue of the
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-318(3).

For this reason,

First Security respectfully requests that the Court issue a fully
reasoned opinion in this case.
For the same reason, First Security requests oral
argument to assist the Court in the decision process.

-2-

ARGUMENT
I.

THE CREDIT UNION HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT ITS PURPORTED
NOTICE MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 70A-9-318(3).
The Credit Union has failed to show that its notice of

assignment adequately met the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §
70A-9-318(3).

Section 318(3) provides as follows:
(3) The account debtor is
authorized to pay the assignor until the
account debtor receives notification
that the amount due or to become due has
been assigned and that payment is to be
made to the assignee. A notification
which does not reasonably identify the
rights assigned is ineffective. If
requested by the account debtor, the
assignee must seasonably furnish
reasonable proof that the assignment has
been made and unless he does so the
account debtor may pay the assignor.

The cases consistently hold that section 318(3) requires that the
account debtor be notified both that the account has been
assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee.

City of

North Miami v. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co.. 505 So.2d 511
(Fla. App. 1987); Union Investment, Inc. v. Midland-Guardian Co.,
30 Ohio App. 3d 59# 506 N.E.2d 271 (1986); Vacura v. Haar's
Equipment, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1985); First Trust &
Savings Bank v. Skokie Fed. Savings and Loan Assoc, 126 111.
App. 3d 42, 466 N.E.2d 1048 (1984).

Failing such notice, the

account debtor may pay the account creditor.
In this case, the notice provided by the Credit Union
stated as follows:
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ASSIGNMENT OF SAVINGS CERTIFICATE
We are holding as collateral on a Line of
Credit Savings Certificate No. 984993 in the
Amount of $99,999.00, in the name of
Renaissance Exchange. Renaissance Exchange
Inc. is willing to pledge this certificate as
collateral on their loan with America First
Credit Union.
Renaissance Exchange, Inc.
By:/s/
Title
American First Credit Union is holding the
original certificate as collateral. We would
appreciate your acknowledgement of the
Assignment, also confirming the balance of
$99,999.00. This Assignment will be in
effect until you have received written notice
of our release of the Assignment. Please
acknowledge the Assignment and the balance by
signing below. One copy should be retained
in your files.
First Security Bank of Utah
By:/s/
Title
(Statement of Facts, 17.)1 There was no further contact between
the Credit Union and First Security regarding the account held at
First Security by Renaissance Exchange, Inc. ("Renaissance").
(Statement of Facts, 510.)

Furthermore, the trial court

specifically found that this notice "did not contain any
instructions directing First Security Bank to take action.

The

credit union was simply notifying First Security Bank that it had

References to "Statement of Facts" refer to the Statement
of Facts located on pages 5 through 10 of First Security's
opening brief.
-4-

an interest in the certificate of deposit."

(Addendum "A,"

Sis.)2

In attempting to show that the notice was adequate, the
Credit Union argues that notice under section 318(3) need only be
"reasonable," and that what is reasonable depends on the facts
and circumstances of each case.

The Credit Union then argues

that its notice was reasonable under the particular facts of this
case.
First Security does not dispute that notice must be
reasonable, and that reasonableness may be a function of the
facts of the particular case.

The Credit Union's rule of

reasonableness, however, cannot write out of the law the
requirement that the notice contain a direction that payment is
to be made to the assignee.

Even the cases cited in the Credit

Union's brief contained a direction that payment be made. See,
e.g., Hall Bros. Const. Co.. Inc. v. Mercantile National Bank,
642 N.E.2d 285, 1994 WL 615303 (Ind. App. Nov. 9, 1994) ("until
further notice, your payments due to the [account
creditor/assignor] are to be made directly to the [assignee]");
Warrington v. Dawson. 798 F.2d 1533, 1534 (5th Cir. 1986)
("please indicate by signing below that you will make all checks
payable on this account to [assignor] and [assignee]"); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Albany Water Board. 590 N.Y.S.2d 312,
313 (App. Div. 1992) ("Dealer authorizes and directs Purchaser to

References to "Addendum" refer to the addendum of First
Security's opening brief.
-5-

make its checks in payment of the foregoing accounts payable to
[assignee]"); Municipal Trust and Savings Bank v. Grant Park
Community District Number 6. 171 111. App. 289, 525 N.E.2d 255,
256 (1988) ("[We] would collectively appreciate you making all
checks due [assignor] payable jointly to [assignee] and
[assignor]").
The only case without a direction that payment was to
be made to the assignee was First National Bank v. Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Co,, 91 N.M. 126, 571 P.2d 118,
120 (1977), where the court held that no such direction was
needed because the assignment at issue was an absolute
assignment, as opposed to an assignment for collateral purposes.
In First National Bank, the notice specifically advised the
account debtor that the assignor retained no interest whatever in
the account.

It was unnecessary to tell the account debtor to

pay the assignee because the assignee was now the only owner of
the account.

By contrast, in this case, the trial court found

that the Credit Union merely advised First Security that it had
an "interest in the certificate of deposit."
1l9.)

(Addendum "A,"

The notice itself states that the assignment is for

"collateral" purposes.

Thus, Renaissance clearly retained an

interest in the account, which triggers the requirement of a
direction that payment be made to the Credit Union.
The Credit Union cites the following as the "particular
facts" of this case that make its non-notice adequate:

First

Security's putting a hold on the account, America First's
-6-

possession of the Savings Certificate, and the fact that this is
not an "indirect collection situation."
30-31.

Appellee's Brief, pp.

These facts clearly do not save the notice.
First, the fact that First Security set a "hold" on the

account cannot serve as a substitute for proper notice. The
Credit Union cites only one case for the proposition that the
adequacy of notice may be affected by the account debtor's
response.

See Municipal Trust and Savings Bank v. Grant Park

Community District Number 6. 171 111. App. 289, 525 N.E.2d 235
(1988).

It clearly is not a majority position.

Furthermore, the

notice in Municipal Trust does contain a direction to pay the
assignee:
This is to notify you that we are working with the
aforementioned company [assignor] and thus would
collectively appreciate you making all checks due
[assignor] payable jointly to [assignee and assignor]
until notice is given to discontinue said practice.
525 N.E.2d at 256 (emphasis added).

The notice contained an

acknowledgement, which was signed by the account debtor:

"I, the

undersigned, hereby acknowledge the above and will comply with
your request."

Id.

The court went on to hold that under the

circumstances the notice fulfilled the requirement to "reasonably
identify the rights of the assignee and reasonably demand payment
to the assignee."

Id. at 258. Municipal Trust in no way does

away with the requirement that the notice contain a demand for

-7-

payment,3

Since the Credit Union's notice indisputably contains

no direction at all regarding payment, it fails.
Second, America First's possession of the Savings
Certificate has nothing to do with any kind of notice to First
Security.

It may explain something concerning the knowledge of

America First, but nothing about what America First told First
Security.4
Third, the Credit Union's "indirect collection"
argument is answered by Union Investment. Inc. v. MidlandGuardian Co., 30 Ohio App. 3d 59, 506 N.E.2d 271 (1986), where
the court upheld the requirement of a demand for payment in a
non-indirect collection situation.
None of the Credit Union's "facts" can change Section
318(3)'s fundamental requirement, confirmed in numerous cases
cited in the briefs, that the notice contain a demand for
payment.

While the notice need not contain any specific "magic

words," it must contain something.

As the Utah Supreme Court

stated in Time Finance Corporation v. Johnson Trucking Co., Inc..
23 Utah 2d 115, 458 P.2d 813 (1969),
The fact, however, of such substitution
of a new creditor must, in order to make the
debtor liable to the assignee, be brought
3

Ironically, in post-trial briefing the Credit Union itself
stated that an adequate notice must include a "demand certain,"
for payment, and made the preposterous claim that its notice made
an "explicit" demand for payment. (Record at 234; Addendum "G,"
p. 10 n.2.)
4

It should be noted that although the certificate stated
that it would not be cashed unless presented, it also had clearly
expired. (Statement of Facts, Hll-12.)
-8-

home to the debtor with much exactness and
certainty before he has paid the debt. . . .
He must pay to his original creditor when the
debt is due, unless he can establish
affirmatively that someone else has a better
right. The notice to him, therefore, must be
of so exact and specific a character as to
convince him that he is no longer liable to
such original creditor . . . .
458 P.2d at 876-77.

The Credit Union's notice clearly fails this

test because, as the trial court found, the notice contained no
direction that First Security take any kind of action.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting judgment against
First Security.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS ON
THE ISSUE OF A CREDIT TO FIRST SECURITY.
The Credit Union misses the import of First Security's

argument that it should have received a $19,096.03 credit, based
on the consolidation of collateral derived from the pay-off of
the Valley Bank loan.

The purpose of the third and final loan to

Renaissance was to pay off Valley Bank so that collateral could
be consolidated at the Credit Union, thereby strengthening its
position as a secured lender.

(Statement of Facts, Kl8.)

That

purpose was fulfilled, but only because Renaissance withdrew the
funds in its account with First Security, from which it derived
the additional $19,096.03 necessary to pay off Valley Bank.
(Statement of Facts, 1116-18.)
The consolidation of collateral was a benefit to the
Credit Union.

In fact, it was the primary purpose of the loan.

(Statement of Facts, 1l8.)

It "purchased" that benefit with the

extra $19,096.03, which Renaissance used to repay its loan from
-9-

Valley Bank.

For that reason, First Security should have

received a credit in that amount.

At the least, the trial court

should have supported his legal conclusions on this issue with
adequate factual findings.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in holding that the Credit Union
properly complied with Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) because the
Credit Union's notice contained no direction that payment was to
be made to the Credit Union.

The court also erred in holding

that First Security is not entitled to a reduction in damages
equal to the portion of the account proceeds which were used to
fulfill the principal purpose of the loan and in failing to
prepare adequate findings in support of its legal conclusions.
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court should be reversed
and judgment entered in favor of First Security.

In the

alternative, judgment should be vacated and the case should be
remanded for further findings.
DATED this O 0

day of December, 1994.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

&

D£e R. Chambers
Scott A. Hagen
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